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An Entry of a British Overseas Bank into the Eurodollar Market in the 1950s: The Case of 
Bolsa1 
Ayumu Sugawara2 (Tohoku University) 
 
The presence of eurodollar markets is considered as one of the significant characteristics of 
the international financial system in the second half of the twentieth century. While early 
eurodollar markets emerged across Europe, the largest market was and has been in London. It 
is due to the establishment of the eurodollar market that London has been able to maintain its 
position as the leading international financial centre, ranking only with New York, despite the 
decline of the British pound as an international currency.3 
Historically, a variety of causes has been identified for the formation of the eurodollar 
market, including the actions of banks from the communist world, domestic interest-rate 
restrictions in the United States, and the United States international balance of payments 
deficit. However, these factors do not explain why the eurodollar markets were concentrated 
in London. Numerous reasons have been indicated for this concentration, such as the lack of 
government restrictions on acceptance of foreign deposits and activities of merchant banks in 
London.4 These reasons have been stated from the perspective of elucidating the advantages 
of the international financial market in London as well as the banks in the City. 
According to conventional wisdom and analyses focused on Britain, the first factor that was 
believed to have lead to the expansion of the eurodollar market in London was the prohibition 
by the British government in 1957 of trade with other countries in pound sterling. A number 
of British banks responded to this restriction by conducting eurodollar trade financing.5  
Although this viewpoint has been generally accepted, for a long period, there were no 
attempts to elucidate the formation of the eurodollar market at the level of individual banks in 
London due to substantial limitations of available data. 
However, Jones made it possible to study the actions of leading banks in the formation of 
the eurodollar market in London from a new perspective by conducting advanced research on 
a previously overlooked category—British overseas banks. Using data from individual British 
overseas banks, Jones clarified one portion of eurodollar market formation from a historical 
research perspective.6 In his study, he examined the role of the Bank of London & South 
America (Bolsa), which also is the subject of this paper, as a pioneer in the formation 
                                                 
1 The author would like to express gratitude to Ms. Sara Millard, the Archivist of the Bank of 
England and the Lloyds Banking Group and their staff members, Dr. John Booker (Former 
Archivist), Ms. Karen Sampson (the Archivist), and Ms. Silvia Gallotti, for giving permission 
to access to the records and for their advice and supports. This work was financially supported 
by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 16K03766. 
2 An Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku 
University, Sendai, Japan. Email: sugawara@econ.tohoku.ac.jp 
3 From a wider perspective on British economic history, Cain and Hopkins emphasized the 
expansion of the eurodollar market due to which London has been able to survive as a global 
financial centre. Cain and Hopkins, British imperialism, pp. 292–3. On the decline of the 
pound, see the latest result, Schenk, The decline of sterling. 
4 Recent reviews of past explanations of eurodollar market formation are found in Schenk, 
‘The origins of the eurodollar market’, pp. 223–34; Burn, ‘The state, the City and the 
euromarkets’, pp. 229-31; Battilossi, ‘Introduction’, pp. 10-11; Schenk, ‘Crisis and 
opportunity’, pp. 207-10; Baker and Collins, ‘London as an international banking centre’, p. 
256; Toniolo, Central banking cooperation, pp. 452–5. 
5 Clendenning, The euro-dollar market, p.23. 
6 Jones, ‘Competitive advantages’; idem, British multinational banking. 
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eurodollar market. The bank was established in 1923 with the merger of the London and River 
Plate Bank with the London and Brazilian Bank. It was a British overseas bank whose main 
line of business was the financing of trade between Britain and Latin America. In 1936, Bolsa 
absorbed the Anglo-South American Bank, thereby making it the only British overseas bank 
in Latin America.7 
According to Jones, the main reason for Bolsa’s early entry into the eurodollar market was 
that the bank faced a competitive disadvantage of being dependent on the pound sterling, 
particularly in Latin America where most trade and investment was conducted in U.S. dollars 
and American banks were rather active.8 However, Jones considered Sir George Bolton, the 
erstwhile executive director of the Bank of England who became the chairman of Bolsa in 
1957, as the engine of change towards the extensive use of the U.S. dollar.9 Prior to 
becoming the chairman of Bolsa, Bolton was a foreign exchange dealer in the 1920s and an 
officer in charge of foreign exchange in the Bank of England after the 1930s. He expected that 
the international use of sterling would virtually cease; however, London had the unique 
competitive advantage of having an agglomeration of worldwide financial services.10 Bolton 
established a new foreign exchange department in Bolsa with instruction for dealers to seek 
deposits in foreign currencies in order to facilitate transactions in Latin America and 
Europe.11 
Then, Schenk also conducted a study on the process of the formation of the London 
eurodollar market, thereby increasing the level of research on this subject. Schenk clarified 
the shares of eurodollar deposits by bank category during the eurodollar market’s formative 
period 1962-3, which was previously unclear. Her study revealed that the share of eurodollar 
deposits in British overseas banks was largely the same as those of merchant banks and the 
London branches of American banks, which had already been established as powerful players 
in eurodollar market formation.12 Subsequently, Battilossi extended Schenk’s findings and 
clarified the shares of various categories of banks in eurodollar deposits dating back to 
1958.13 
Further, Schenk revealed that the eurodollar market was not formed in 1957, as previously 
believed, but in 1955; the first market participant was Midland Bank. Midland Bank began 
accepting eurodollar deposits in order to respond to a situation in which there was a decrease 
in the amounts of deposits at clearing banks for the first time since the Second World War. 
This was because funds were transferred from bank deposits to British treasury bills due to an 
increase in the interest rate on treasuries at the end of February 1955.14 Thus, Schenk’s 
approach provided a direction for explaining the formation of the eurodollar market through 
empirical and, in particular, quantitative information of the business requirements of 
individual banks at the time. 
In light of the above discussion, the subject of this paper is to elucidate the main causes of 
Bolsa’s early participation in the formation of eurodollar markets, with a particular focus on 
Jones’ findings. His findings can be said to have provided an indication of important facts. In 
particular, very little quantitative information is provided on Bolsa’s eurodollar business and 
                                                 
7 Joslin, A century of banking; Holley, ‘Bolsa under Sir George Bolton’. 
8 Jones, ‘Competitive advantages’, pp. 51–2; idem, British multinational banking, p. 264. 
9 Jones, British multinational banking, pp. 264–5. 
10 Ibid., pp. 264–5. 
11 Ibid., p. 325; Fry, A banker’s world, p. 32. 
12 Schenk, ‘The origins of the eurodollar market’, p. 230. 
13 Battilossi, ‘Banking with multinationals’, p. 106, tab. 5.1. 
14 Schenk, ‘The origins of the eurodollar market’, pp. 224–9; Economist, 19 Feb. 1955, p. 
666, 26 Feb. 1955, p. 758, and 5 March 1955, p. 846. 
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eurodollar market conditions. Thus, Bolsa’s financial documents stored in Lloyds Banking 
Group Archives have been used. As done by Schenk, we explore the formation of the 
eurodollar market by focusing on the business necessities of individual banks. 
In order to conduct this study from an analytical perspective, we utilise the bank internal 
funds circulation approach given by Nishimura in his research on HSBC.15 In his study, 
Nishimura clarified the roles of each branch of HSBC in 1913 by reconstructing branch 
balance sheets and indicating their financial surpluses or deficits. 
The period under study in this paper is 1957-63. The reason that this period is considered is, 
firstly, because information on Bolsa’s eurodollar business can be found in the bank’s 
financial records for this period. Secondly, it was in 1957 that the British government 
prohibited trade financing in pound sterling between countries other than Britain. Prior to 
Schenk’s study, the eurodollar market was considered to have been established in 1957. The 
impact of the prohibition is significant from the viewpoint of international finance, 
particularly with regard to the substitution of sterling with dollar. Finally, in 1963 a number of 
major changes took place in the banking industry: an increase in the maximum interest rate 
permitted under Regulation Q, the announcement of eurocurrency market statistics by the 
Bank for International Settlements, the collapse of certain firms that participated in eurodollar 
markets, and the appearance of the eurobond market.  
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner: In Section I, we identify 
the size of the eurodollar market 1957-63, scale of eurodollar deposits according to bank 
category, and scale of Bolsa eurodollar deposits. In Section II, we present a quantitative 
description of the impact of Bolsa’s participation in eurodollar markets on Bolsa’s 
management structure. In Section III, we describe the content of the eurodollar business of 
Bolsa’s London branch. In Section IV, we analyse the main causes that led to Bolsa’s early 
participation in the eurodollar market. In Section V, the conclusion, we indicate the 
relationship between the results of the analysis in this paper and the findings of Schenk’s 
study. 
 
I 
 
In 1964, the Bank of England began preparing statistics on the size of the London eurodollar 
market.16 This clarified the scale of the foreign currency liabilities of banks in London at the 
end of 1957 and later. These data are depicted in figure 1, which reveals that banks in London 
carry foreign currency liabilities of approximately £71 million at the starting point. According 
to the Bank of England, in around 1955, the foreign currency liabilities of London banks were 
approximately £50 million.17 This figure reached approximately £1.75 billion by the end of 
1964, as the eurodollar markets grew rapidly.18 
 
Figure 1 
                                                 
15 Nishimura, ‘The flow of funds’. 
16 The statistics in figure 1 are overestimated as compared with statistics for subsequent years, 
such as the figures cited in table 2. However, the author uses the older estimation because of 
consistency with the data prepared by Bolsa’s staff in the bank’s documents. 
17 Bank of England, ‘U.K. bank’s external liabilities’, p. 101. 
18 The eurodollar market constituted a part of the Eurocurrency markets. Hereafter, in this 
paper, we will limit our discussion to the eurodollar market. Moreover, we will use the term 
eurodollar market in cases that, strictly speaking, should be referred to as eurocurrency 
markets. Separate study is required to identify the causes of growth in non-dollar 
eurocurrency markets. 
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Figure 2 illustrates the trends in the amount of foreign currency deposits at Bolsa’s London 
branch. It is believed that in 1957 the London branch held foreign currency deposits 
amounting to approximately $2–3 million.19 Thereafter, foreign currency deposits continued 
to grow rapidly, rising from $3.7 million in September 1957 to $106.2 million in December 
1958, $190.9 million in December 1959, $281.7 million in December 1960, $351 million in 
December 1961, and $444.7 million in December 1962. However, in December 1963, the 
value of these deposits fell year on year to $420.8 million, and were at $471.7 million in 
December 1964. The data for March 1961 and a separation of dollar deposits from those in 
other currencies indicate that approximately 80 per cent of the London branch’s foreign 
currency deposits were dollar deposits. 
 
Figure 2 
 
However, the question that remains is what was the share of the London branch’s foreign 
currency deposits in the entire London foreign currency deposit market? Table 1 presents 
Bolsa’s share in the London foreign currency deposit market from a comparison of figures 1 
and 2. It is evident from table 1 that Bolsa’s shares in 1958 and 1959 are exceptional. In 
subsequent years as well, Bolsa continued to maintain a fairly large share of foreign currency 
deposits for a single bank—at 15 per cent or more in 1960–2 and 11 per cent in 1963.20 Thus, 
Bolsa came to be considered a leading bank in the eurodollar market, which is evident from 
table 1. 
 
Table 1 
 
Table 2 presents information on the proportion of foreign currency deposits of banks in 
various categories for the period 1957-63. Ranked by bank category, in 1958, British overseas 
banks had the highest share, followed by British clearing banks. In 1959, foreign banks other 
than U.S. and Japanese banks slightly exceeded the share of British overseas banks, which 
continued to maintain a 25 per cent share. After 1959, British overseas banks were surpassed 
by U.S. banks but retained the second place, followed by accepting houses and other foreign 
banks. However, as seen above, Bolsa held a large amount of foreign currency deposits 
independently; Bolsa’s share of foreign currency deposits among British overseas banks was 
80 per cent in 1961, 67 per cent in 1962, and 53 per cent in 1963.21 For this reason, it may be 
stated that the reference to British overseas banks in the context of the foreign currency 
                                                 
19 ‘London branch U. S. dollar deposits’, 21 Dec. 1961, F2/D, LA (hereafter LA). 
20 The estimation of Bolsa’s staff of the bank’s shares in the London Eurocurrency markets 
were 15.5% in Dec. 1962, 12.2% in Dec. 1963, and 10.3% in Sept. 1964. ‘London branch 
U.S. dollar deposits’, Jan. 1965, LA, F2/D/Rep.8. 
21 This has been estimated using the following procedure: For estimating the size of  
eurocurrency deposits in British overseas banks, use the data presented in figure 1 as the total  
amount of eurocurrency deposits in London and the data presented in table 2 as the shares of  
different banks in London. Then, the sizes of the eurocurrency markets are multiplied by the  
eurocurrency shares of British overseas banks in each year in the period 1958-60. However,  
this procedure is not appropriate because the data presented in table 2 for the period only  
deals with eurodollar deposits, while the data on Bolsa’s foreign currency deposits that is  
prepared by the bank’s staff only indicates the total eurocurrency deposits before 1961, as is  
shown in figure 2. 
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deposit market is largely the same as referring to Bolsa.22 
 
Table 2 
 
However, Bolsa was a relatively small bank as compared to other British overseas banks. In 
1955, Bolsa’s rank among British overseas banks in terms of balance-sheet size had fallen to 
seventh place from fourth place in 1948. While the total assets of other British overseas banks 
increased, those of Bolsa decreased. From the end of the 1940s to the first half of the 1950s, 
Bolsa had faced tough conditions in Latin America.23 Bolsa’s amount of deposits fell in 1954 
and then remained stagnant until 1957.24 However, these deposits began to increase in 1958, 
and by 1964, the bank was ranked sixth in terms of total assets. Despite the fact that it was 
small in comparison to other leading overseas banks such as HSBC and the Chartered Bank, 
Bolsa became a key player in the initial eurodollar market. Banks that were also regarded by 
contemporaries as important players in the eurodollar market in its formative years included 
Schroder, Kleinwort Benson, Brown Shipley (merchant banks), Société Générale (French 
bank), and ANZ (British overseas bank).25 In addition, Hambros which was also merchant 
bank began releasing its amount of foreign currency deposits in 1955.26 From the above 
discussion, it is evident that it is appropriate to focus on Bolsa when attempting to clarify the 
process of formation of the eurodollar market in London. 
 
 
II 
 
The acceptance of large amounts of eurodollar deposits had a significant impact on Bolsa’s 
business conditions. Figure 3 presents the trends in the foreign currency and total amount of 
deposits at the London branch. What is most apparent from figure 3 is the fact that foreign 
currency deposits had come to account for the bulk of deposits at the London branch. The fact 
that most of the deposits at the London branch during this period were foreign currency 
deposits indicates that the rapid increase in foreign currency deposits itself represented a rapid 
increase in the overall deposits at Bolsa’s London branch. 
 
Figure 3 
 
In this section, we identify the changes in Bolsa before and after the formation of the 
eurodollar market by comparing data for the years 1955, 1960, and 1963. Table 3 presents 
Bolsa’s total deposits in branches of various countries in 1955: deposits in the London branch 
totalled £11.18 million, or 13.5 per cent of the total; deposits in the Spain branch were at 
£17.32 million (20.9 per cent), those in the U.S. branch were at £13.54 million (16.3 per cent), 
and those in the Brazil branch totalled £10.2 million (14.2 per cent). Thus, it is evident that 
the deposits in the London branch were the smallest among the worldwide branches of Bolsa 
in 1955. 
 
                                                 
22 Schenk noted that in 1962 Bolsa had approximately 40% share in Eurocurrency deposits of  
British overseas banks. Schenk, ‘The origins of the eurodollar market’, p. 231. 
23 Jones told ‘by 1949 Bolsa’s ability to raise deposits in many Latin American countries was 
strictly limited’. Jones, ‘Competitive advantages’, p. 51. 
24 Jones, British multinational banking, app. 5. 
25 ‘The eurodollar market’, 16 March 1962, LA, F2/D/Rep. 8. 
26 Altman, ‘Recent developments in foreign markets’, p. 69. 
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Table 3 
 
This country-wise distribution of deposits fluctuated considerably from 1955 to 1960. In 
1960, the amount of deposits in the London branch increased to £90.31 million, or 45.1 per 
cent of the total, making it the central source of funds for Bolsa. The rapid increase in deposits 
at the London branch was extraordinary even in the context of Bolsa. After the London branch 
came the Argentina branch at £26.99 million (13.5 per cent) and the U.S. branch at £14 
million (7.0 per cent). Subsequently, the share of the London branch experienced further rapid 
growth, with its deposits totalling £242.39 million (74.3 per cent) in 1963. Thus, it is evident 
that it was the London branch that accepted most of Bolsa’s deposits. The rapid growth in 
eurodollar deposits at the London branch established the branch’s centrality among branches 
within Bolsa as a whole. However, the London branch became the central source of funds for 
Bolsa much later than the London branches of other British overseas banks.27 
The fact that the London branch had become a central source of funds for Bolsa may be 
confirmed from other indicators as well. Firstly, examining the size of the balance sheets 
indicates that at the London branch this figure increased 12.4 times from £11.07 million in 
1955 to £136.98 million in 1960.28 While the deposits in the London branch increased 8.1 
times 1955-60, its balance sheet grew at a faster pace. Moreover, the London branch’s share in 
the size of the balance sheet of Bolsa as a whole underwent a remarkable transformation from 
7.9 per cent in 1955 to 55.8 per cent in 1960.29 In 1963, the size of the balance sheet of 
Bolsa’s London branch was £162.67, accounting for a share of 41.9 per cent of the entire 
bank’s balance sheet. Thus, it is evident that the share of the London branch had fallen over a 
period of three years. However, in 1963, the size of the head office balance sheet was £14.09 
million from £12.95 million in 1960 and £17.97 million in 1955;30 the head office was also 
located in London.31 
This growth in the size of the London branch’s balance sheet is a clear indicator of the shift 
in the centre of Bolsa’s business to the London branch. It must be noted that if only the 
deposits of the London branch had increased, it would have indicated that the branch has 
merely collected funding, with the funds perhaps destined for overseas branches; however, the 
growth in assets at the London branch indicates that the collected funds were utilized in 
London as well. A detailed discussion of the use of these funds will be conducted at a later 
stage in the paper. 
Further, the growth in the size of the balance sheet of the London branch also markedly 
increased the weight of the London branch in the bank’s profits. As is evident from table 4, 
the London branch’s profits in 1955 were £196,000, or 15.6 per cent of the overall bank 
profits; this figure increased to £684,000, or 29.5 per cent of the overall bank profits, in 1960. 
Although the pace of growth in the profits of the London branch was slower than that of the 
growth in its balance sheet, in 1963 the branch’s profits amounted to £1.771 million, or 53.8 
per cent of the overall bank profits. Thus, the contribution of the London branch to overall 
business for Bolsa was significant in the period under consideration. 
 
Table 4 
                                                 
27 Nishimura, ‘The flow of funds’, pp. 42–3, tab. 2.8. In 1913, the London branch of HSBC 
had the largest balance sheet size and was the largest fund supplier to other branches although 
financial data on the bank’s Hong Kong head office is not available. 
28 ‘Summary balance sheets’, Dec. 1955 and Dec. 1960, LA, F2/CA/Acc.2. 
29 Ibid. 
30 ‘Summary balance sheets’, June 1963, LA, F2/CA/Acc.2. 
31 ‘Summary balance sheets’, Dec. 1955 and Dec. 1960, LA, F2/CA/Acc.2. 
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III 
 
Table 5 presents the state of the use of dollar deposits at Bolsa’s London branch 1960-4. The 
use of dollar deposits was roughly divided into dollar re-deposits, dollar loans and overdrafts, 
and term lending or pool funding after conversion to pound sterling.32 
 
Table 5 
 
What is most evident in table 5 is the fact that throughout this period the re-depositing of 
unconverted dollars was the most common use of dollar deposits. However, this share 
displayed a decreasing trend, falling from approximately 80 per cent in 1960 to 53 per cent in 
1963. However, in 1964, the share of dollar re-deposits rose slightly to 64 per cent. 
Table 6 presents a breakdown of dollar re-deposits at the London branch 1960-3. As is 
evident from this table, dollar re-deposits included those monies that were re-deposited with 
other banks as well as those re-deposited with other Bolsa branches; the re-deposits with other 
banks accounted for the bulk of dollar re-deposits. 
 
Table 6 
 
It must be noted that these interbank re-deposits were a central business in the eurodollar 
market as a whole. Each bank that accepted eurodollars secured its interest-rate margin by 
re-depositing them with other banks, and this resulted in a steady expansion of deposits. 
However, the interest-rate margins were rather small, ranging from 1/8 to 1/32 of a point.33 
Even at Bolsa, such dollar re-deposits constituted the centre of the eurodollar business. 
Next, in table 7 we provide a comparison of the geographical distribution of dollar 
re-deposits for Bolsa and other banks in London as a whole. The distribution could be 
compared using detailed categories for 1964 only. The aspect that greatly differentiated the 
destinations of dollar re-deposits between British banks as a whole and Bolsa was the fact that 
the weight of Latin America was 3 per cent for British banks as a whole and 13 per cent for 
Bolsa. However, some of these dollars were distributed through deposits with banks of 
respective countries that were located in London, while others were distributed through 
deposits with banks located in their home countries. 
 
Table 7 
 
Further, dollar deposits with other branches, as is evident from table 8, provide a clear 
picture of Bolsa’s business interests outside London. Branches that accepted dollar deposits 
from London were the New York, Brazilian, Paris, and Buenos Aires branches. The scale of 
these deposits was largest at New York, where it ranged from $6 million to $11 million, 
followed by Brazil where it ranged from $1 million to $7.38 million in the period from 1960 
to 1964. Further, dollar deposits were placed with the Paris branch from December 1960 to 
December 1961 and ranged from $900,000 to $9.82 million, and in the Buenos Aires branch 
from May to December 1962 and ranged from $500,000 to $1.65 million. These deposits may 
be considered to represent the distribution of funds to branches that required dollars. The New 
York branch used these dollar deposits for daily business operations and to comply with U.S. 
cash reserve ratio regulations. The Brazilian branches used its dollar deposits to conduct swap 
                                                 
32 ‘London branch utilisation of U.S. dollar deposits’, 11 Jan. 1965, LA, F2/D/Rep. 8. 
33 Altman, ‘Recent developments in foreign markets’, p. 28. 
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transactions in order to obtain the then local currency, cruzeiro. Moreover, the Paris branch 
used its dollar deposits to obtain francs through swap transactions as well as to advance loans 
in dollars.34 
 
Table 8 
 
Further, dollar loans and overdrafts by the London branch also indicate the characteristics 
of Bolsa’s business transactions. Table 9 presents the following distribution of dollar loans 
and overdrafts: Latin America accounted for 48.9 per cent at $24.32 million of the total 
amount of $49.71 million, while Eastern Europe accounted for 15 per cent at $7.55 million, 
and West Germany accounted for 5 per cent at $2.62 million. 
 
Table 9 
 
The purposes of the loans and overdrafts to Latin America were to support Bolsa 
subsidiaries and provide customers with services that could not be handled at branches.35 The 
recipients of Bolsa’s dollar loans and overdrafts included subsidiaries Compania Financiera 
de Londres and Balfor Williamson, while customer recipients included Bonge & Born, SIAM 
Di Tilla, Industrias Kaiser Argentina, Banco de A. Edwards, and Corporation Argentina de 
Productores de Carnes.36 Compania Financiera de Londres was a subsidiary of Bolsa that was 
established in 1961 for the purpose of industrial finance. It was owned by an Argentine board 
of directors and managed by staffs of Bolsa branches in Argentina as well. 37  Balfor 
Williamson was a British merchant bank bought in 1960 by Bolsa. It was active mainly in 
Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, U.S. West Coast, and the Pacific Rim.38 
Overdrafts to Eastern Europe were allocated to finance the imports of Eastern European 
nations from Latin America, while negotiation of bills was allocated to finance exports from 
Eastern Europe to Latin America. Usance bills were valid for no more than six months.39 The 
provision of these loans and overdrafts brought foreign exchange business to Bolsa’s London 
and Latin American branches. Moreover, while the share of loans to West Germany was small, 
numerous loans were advanced to West Germany in currencies other than the dollar as well as 
combined dollar and other currencies loans; the total loan amount was $7.6 million.40 
Currencies included under ‘other’ are those of Britain, Austria, Japan, Luxembourg, and 
Yugoslavia.41 
With regard to the criteria applied to identify borrowers other than Bolsa subsidiaries and 
key customers, borrowers with top international creditworthiness or those who were able to 
obtain equivalent guarantees, and either affiliates of companies from hard currency countries 
such as U.S., Japan, Australia, Britain, and Europe or those with dollar revenues were eligible 
for receiving loans and overdrafts.42 
Part of Bolsa’s London branch dollar deposits was converted to pound sterling and then 
transferred to term loans and London branch pool funds. The percentage of total dollar 
                                                 
34 ‘London branch U. S. dollar deposits’, 21 Dec. 1961, LA, F2/D. 
35 ‘London branch U. S. dollar deposits’, 17 Dec. 1963, LA, F2/D. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Joslin, A century of banking, p. 290. 
38 Ibid. 
39 ‘London branch U. S. dollar deposits’, 17 Dec. 1963, LA, F2/D. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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deposits accounted for by term loans in pounds increased in importance from approximately 
15 per cent in 1960 to range from 11–20 per cent in 1961, 18–24 per cent in 1962, and 21–25 
per cent in 1963. Thereafter, there was a slight decline in 1964 to the range of 15–20 per cent. 
A breakdown of term-loan borrowers reveals that in October 1962 loans to banks and other 
financial institutions totalled £16.05 million while those to British local governments 
amounted to £7.25 million; in November 1963 the former category totalled £18.12 million 
and the latter £11.95 million, and in November 1964 the former was £9.42 million and the 
latter £13.4 million.43 
The borrowings by British local governments were an important structural element of the 
formative period of the eurodollar market. Eurodollar borrowing by the local governments 
began in September 1955 because in that year the British government, for financial reasons, 
prohibited local governments from borrowing from the Public Works Loan Board. This 
resulted in local governments borrowing large amounts of short-term funds.44 Like other 
banks, Bolsa was also committed to this important business in the eurodollar market. 
The factors responsible for the formation of the eurodollar market in London may be 
viewed in light of this demand for borrowing by local governments.45 However, since the 
move toward intake of large amount of eurodollars converted to domestic currency as a result 
of domestic financial conditions was a phenomenon that actually was seen in other countries 
such as Italy, Japan, and the U.S., there is a room for further study to determine whether this 
point can be considered a key factor behind London becoming a leading eurodollar market. 
Next, an examination of the pool funds of the London branch reveals that these funds were 
diverted towards purchase of current assets by the branch. Specifically, these current assets 
include brokers’ loans as well as treasuries, other gilt-edged securities, and short-term trade 
bills.46 
The above discussion reveals that in the London branch’s eurodollar business, dollar 
re-deposits to other banks and pound term loans represented participation in important areas 
of the eurodollar market. Although such activities were undertaken in other banks as well, 
Bolsa’s unique contribution is indicated in its use of dollar deposits for re-deposits in its 
branches as well as for loans, overdrafts, and negotiation of bills to Latin America and 
Europe. 
 
IV 
 
Through the eurodollar business, Bolsa increased both its size and profits. In order to consider 
the reasons for Bolsa’s early entry into the eurodollar market, the following four factors are 
taken into consideration: Dollar deposits from the London branch to other branches, 
inter-branch balances, comments of the bank chairman in 1958, and Latin American external 
finance. The former two factors are elucidated in the first portion of this section and the latter 
two facts are considered in the second portion. 
In this regard, the following hypothesis is proposed to explain the reasons for Bolsa’s early 
entry into the eurodollar market: Bolsa’s London branch first began accepting dollar deposits 
in order to enable its Latin American branches to deal with shortage of funds. This was 
because the dollar was convertible into Latin American local currencies and was used in the 
United States. 
                                                 
43 ‘London branch U.S. dollar deposits’, 11 Jan. 1965, LA. 
44 Schenk, ‘The origins of eurodollar market’, p. 228. 
45 Grant, The machinery of finance, p. 140; Schenk, ‘The origins of the eurodollar market’,  
p. 228. 
46 ‘London branch U. S. dollar deposits’, 11 Jan. 1965, LA. 
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Firstly, we consider the relationship between the London branch’s dollar deposits and 
Bolsa’s internal flow of funds for the period 1960–3, for which information on dollar deposits 
from the London branch to other branches is available. The dollar deposits supplied from the 
London branch to other branches in the end of each year are presented in table 10, which has 
been created using table 8. We inter-relate the dollar flows and total flow of funds in Bolsa. 
An examination of the inter-branch balances reveals Bolsa’s internal flow of funds, which are 
presented in table 11 that has been created from information presented in the appendix. In this 
table, we use balances by country, and add inter-branch balances for each country. The 
negative values in table 11 and the appendix are for countries that were recipients of funding, 
while the other values are for countries that provided funding. It is evident from table 11 and 
the appendix, that the U.S., Brazil, and the London head office were recipients of large 
amounts of funds, while the London branch was the greatest fund provider. However, since 
the head office was located in the same building as the London branch and accepted funds as 
administrative charges, it was considered a non-business-performing division. Consequently, 
the U.S., Brazil, and occasionally French branches accepted funds to conduct their business. 
These findings are in agreement with the providers and recipients of dollar funds that have 
been mentioned in the available bank data. Now, we compare the figures for each country by 
comparing tables 10 and 11. 
 
Table 10 
 
Table 11 
 
Although Argentina received dollar deposits in 1962 only, this is unrelated to an excess or 
shortage of funds in the country. During this period, Argentina was a provider of funding. On 
the other hand, Brazil was a recipient of funds in every year except 1962. In 1962, when it 
was a provider of funds, the amount of dollar deposits was low in the country. Throughout 
this entire period, the U.S. was a receiver of funds as well as a receiver of dollar deposits. 
France was a receiver of funds in 1960 and 1961 and a fund provider thereafter. Moreover, 
even in terms of dollar deposits it was a fund receiver in 1960 and 1961 but did not receive 
any funds in subsequent years. Further, London was a provider of funds throughout the entire 
period. Thus, it is evident from these findings that while there was no apparent relationship 
apparent between dollar deposits and balance by country in the case of Argentina, both these 
aspects were closely related in Brazil, the U.S., France, and London. 
Next, we compare the amounts of funds supplied or received with the amounts of dollar 
deposits in Brazil, the U.S., and France. The results are presented in table 12. It is evident 
from the table that the bulk of funding shortages in each country was covered by dollar 
deposits from London. The ratio of coverage by dollar deposits exceeded 100 per cent in 
certain cases because the figures for balance by country are net figures. Ordinarily, gross 
amounts received would be expected to be larger than net amounts. 
 
Table 12 
 
Further, additional manipulation of the figures was conducted in order to derive the weight 
of dollar deposits as a part of the total amount of funds supplied by the London branch. It 
supplied enormous amounts of funds, ranging from £8.3 million to £89.7 million. However, at 
the same time, the head office also received enormous amounts of funds, ranging from £3.2 
million to £82.5 million. Firstly, we assumed that the entire amount of funds received by the 
head office came from the London branch. Then, assuming that the funds were received in 
pounds since the head office is also located in London we subtracted the amount received by 
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the head office from the amount supplied by the London branch. The remaining balance was 
considered to represent the amount of funds supplied by the London branch to other countries. 
Table 13 compares this amount with the amount of dollar deposits. 
 
Table 13 
 
It is evident from the above table that the London branch supplied funds by utilizing dollar 
deposits. This may be considered a reasonable finding since most of the deposits received by 
the London branch were in dollars. Thus, the above analysis indicates that 1960-3, most of the 
funds supplied by London to Brazil, the U.S., and France was in dollars and was utilized for 
the branches’ conduct of business. 
Since figures on dollar deposits from the London branch to other branches are unavailable 
for years prior to 1960, it is unknown whether supply of funds from the London branch to 
countries that had a shortage of funds was conducted in dollars. Therefore, we must make 
inferences regarding the years prior to 1960 using other available information. For this reason, 
we examine a letter from Bolsa President Sir George Bolton to Deputy Governor Cameron 
Cobbold of the Bank of England, written in 1958.47 This letter indicates that Bolsa faced a 
shortage of funds due to the growth of its business and competition with local and foreign 
banks in Central and South America. The letter states that the London branch of Bolsa 
required funds in order to provide finance to Latin America for certain projects. A few specific 
examples of such projects were £1 million in financing for a construction project in Brazil and 
£2 million for a construction project in Argentina. Further, Bolton also stated that Bolsa 
required dollar funds for use in Central America as the region is part of a dollar-based system, 
and Bolsa was facing stiff local competition in both lending and trade finance due to a 
shortage of funds.48 This contention of Bolton was supported by the fact that in 1956, 
manager of the Rio de Janeiro branch of Bolsa wrote to the head office in London and 
mentioned intensification of local competition and a shortage of cruzeiro.49 
Although Bolton directly mentioned the need for dollars in Central America, he did not 
mention which currency Bolsa would use in Brazil and Argentina. However, it is rather likely 
that supply of funds from London was conducted in dollars to Brazil and in pound sterling to 
Argentina. The first clue in this regard is provided in table 14, which indicates the currency 
used in trade settlement with Latin America and Europe. In 1949, dollar settlement accounted 
for 7 per cent of settlement with the group that included Argentina but 41 per cent with the 
group that included Brazil. Thus, dollar settlement accounted for a large share in Brazil’s trade 
settlement with not just the U.S., but Europe as well. 
 
Table 14 
 
The second clue is foreign exchange control definitions in Brazil. In 1952, Brazil included 
the Belgian franc, Canadian dollar, Portuguese escudo, pound Sterling, Swedish krona, Swiss 
                                                 
47 The letter from G. Bolton to C. F. Cobbold, 7 Jan. 1958, The National Archives,  
T/231/1192. 
48 Ibid. 
49 A letter dated 30 June 1956 and one dated Dec. 1956 from the Rio de Janeiro branch 
manager to the head office. Both in ‘Extracts from managers’ reports on conditions and 
prospects’, LA, F2/D/Rep. 1. Further, a letter dated 31 Dec. from a manager in Venezuela and 
one dated 30 June from the manager in Montevideo also mentioned the intensification of local 
competition. Ibid. 
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franc, U.S. dollar, and Uruguayan peso among hard currencies.50 However, in 1953 only the 
U.S. dollar, Swiss franc, and Portuguese escudo were included in exchangeable currencies. 
Therefore, it is evident that the U.S. dollar was necessary in Brazil for conducting banking 
business. However, in Argentina, there was no such clear systemic statement of the status of 
foreign currencies. 
 
Table 15 
 
The third clue is Brazil’s foreign trade structure, which is presented in table 15. In the 
1950s, Brazil’s foreign trade depended heavily on the U.S.: 38–54 per cent in exports and 
26–45 per cent in imports. This could also be one of the reasons that Bolsa required the U.S. 
dollars for trade finance in Brazil because, for example, when Brazilian importers took loans 
from Bolsa for importing goods from the U.S., these loans were probably given in dollars; 
moreover, when the importers used drafts on New York, the branch in the city had to have 
sufficient dollar funds to pay to exporters who brought the drafts to the New York branch.51 
The latter case can partially explain the why Bolsa’s New York branch required a large 
amount of dollar funds because the New York branch’s dollar funds were paid drafts not only 
from Brazil but also from all countries where Bolsa had business connections in the form of 
branches or business correspondences. On the other hand, when New York importers asked 
for loans from Bolsa’s New York branch for imports from Brazil, these loans also had to be 
advanced in dollars. This case also can explain the reasons for the dollar demand in the New 
York branch and can be extended to cases of imports from countries other than Brazil. Thus, 
the above analysis on the letter from the chairman of Bolsa and the external financial structure 
of Latin America leads to the conclusion that even in the period from 1957 to 1959, Bolsa 
required U.S. dollars to finance foreign trade. This was particularly important since the bank 
had businesses in the U.S. and Latin American countries, in particular, Brazil under the 
situation that using pound sterling was banned for trade finance between third countries. 
Therefore, it may be concluded that the Bolsa’s London branch accepted eurodollars in 
order to supply funds in dollars to branches in countries where financial transactions were 
dominated by the U.S. dollar, such as Central America, Brazil, and the U.S. Moreover, it has 
been established that Bolsa had sufficient motive for prompt action in accepting dollar 
deposits as compared with banks that were not active in North and South America. 
 
V 
 
In the concluding section of this paper, the relationship between this paper’s findings and 
those of Schenk’s study are considered. Schenk clarified that in 1955 Midland Bank was the 
first participant in the eurodollar market. She described the activities of Midland Bank as 
corresponding to those in the market creation stage of Llewellyn’s model of financial 
innovation.52 In this stage, the scope of utilization of new financial products is narrow, and 
the number of firms using them is small as well.53 The market creation stage is followed by 
the spread of innovation stage. New financial products have a life cycle similar to that of 
manufactured products. However, in the case of financial products the period during which 
the innovating firm can enjoy the benefits of being the first to market is even shorter than in 
                                                 
50 IMF, Report on exchange restrictions, 1952, p. 51 and 1953, p. 80. 
51 On procedures of trade finance between branches of international banks, see Nishimura, 
‘The flow of funds’, pp. 27–29. 
52 Llewellyn, ‘Financial innovation’, p. 16. 
53 Schenk, ‘The origins of eurodollar market’, p. 226. 
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the case of manufactured products. The main causes of this are the fact that the initial costs of 
introducing new financial products are relatively low and it is difficult to restrict access to the 
content of new financial products.54 In the section of her paper entitled ‘spread of innovation’, 
Schenk argues that Midland Bank’s initial advantage in the eurodollar market was lost over a 
short period. It is conceivable that the argument in ‘spread of innovation’ could apply to Bolsa 
as well. Table 1 indicates that Bolsa’s share in the eurodollar deposits market was on a 
decreasing trend. 
Thus, both Midland Bank, as seen in Schenk’s study, and Bolsa, as seen in this paper, 
entered the eurodollar market early and on a large scale due to the special factors of a 
worsening liquidity ratio (in Midland Bank’s case) and shortage of local Central and South 
American currencies (in Bolsa’s case). Each of these two examples demonstrates the unique 
characteristics of the market creation stage. Moreover, both these banks have in common the 
fact that in the stage in which the size of the market grew and the anonymity of market 
participants expanded, they were unable to continue holding large market shares. 
One unique characteristic of the case of Bolsa when compared with Midland Bank is the 
fact that the special factor responsible for Bolsa’s entry into the market was related to 
international finance. The case of Bolsa is indicative of the fact that the City of London could 
survive as an international financial centre by combining its extensive financial network and a 
rising international currency, the U.S. dollar, with a confirmation from the viewpoint of the 
requirements of international banking business. However, Bolsa’s business accounted for a 
limited share of the international banking business and financial agglomeration in the City of 
London. Therefore, it is necessary to study the cases of other initial market participants in the 
eurodollar market and compare the case of Bolsa to its competitors in the future.  
                                                 
54 Ibid., p. 229. 
14 
Appendix  
 
Bolsa’s inter-branch accounts by country (£ thousand) 
 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
Argentina -1300 -1400 -1200 -2200 -3100 600 -800 
Brazil -2600 -2400 -2100 -500 -500 -1100 -1200 
U.S. -3600 -2900 -2200 -1800 -2000 -1600 -2900 
London 3900 1600 1200 4700 4600 5700 4900 
Head office 
(in London) -900 -80 -600 -4100 -4500 -5200 -1900 
Chile 100 -900 900 200 80 80 200 
Paraguay 100 70 300 80 400 100 100 
Peru 100 9 50 6 -20 -200 -30 
Uruguay -300 -30 -50 100 100 100 300 
France -100 -90 -200 -30 -10 100 90 
Portugal -60 30 70 90 -5 -10 60 
Spain 50 300 200 70 -80 -60 100 
Bradford 400 400 300 300 200 70 80 
Manchester -40 100 100 -20 10 -10 -70 
Colombia -30 -30 -30 -300 40 -100 300 
Ecuador -6 -30 -10 -60 -3 -10 40 
Guatemala 10 100 50 10 70 70 700 
Nicaragua -30 -80 -20 -30 -3 -10 -10 
El Salvador 700 70 100 300 300 200 100 
Venezuela 100 8 30 -10 70 -50 -50 
Total -3000 -3400 -2900 -3100 -4300 -1200 -5900 
        
 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963  
Argentina 400 2200 10 1400 800 1200  
Brazil -1200 -2100 -2800 -1100 70 -700  
U.S. -2900 -1700 -1600 -5100 -7100 -6500  
London -200 6900 18100 8300 35700 89700  
Head office 
(in London) 2900 -4900 -13200 -3200 -28600 -82500  
Chile -50 -40 100 -50 -900 -70  
Paraguay -60 -200 -300 -600 -300 -200  
Peru 20 0 -1 -30 -40 20  
Uruguay 400 600 200 100 -200 100  
France 100 -400 -1000 -200 40 2  
Portugal 50 100 100 200 60 100  
Spain 20 -10 -200 100 400 600  
Bradford -70 -90 -70 -200 -400 -900  
Manchester 20 10 300 10 -3100 -3100  
Total -1000 300 -400 -400 -3700 -2300  
Notes: 
a ‘-’ (minus) indicates liabilities; other figures indicate assets. For this reason, negative values are for 
countries that are fund recipients and other values are for countries that are fund providers. 
b All branches in Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Venezuela were 
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transferred to the Bank of London and Montreal, which was established as a joint venture of the Bank 
of Montreal and Bolsa in 1958. 
Source: ‘Summary balance sheets’, each year, LA, F2/CA/Acc.2. 
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Figure 1. Size of the London eurocurrency market (US$ million) 
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Notes: 
a The graph presented above uses the amount of foreign liabilities of banks in the U.K. 
denominated in foreign currency. 
b The figures are for December of each year. 
Source: ‘U.K. banks’ external liabilities’, p. 100. 
 
Figure 2. Eurocurrency deposits in Bolsa’s London Branch (US$ million) 
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Notes: 
a Data distinguishing US$ and other currencies are available only from 1961. 
b The figures in the graph are for Dec. of each year. 
Source: ‘London branch U.S. dollar deposits’, Jan. 1965, LA, F2/D/Rep.8.  
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Figure 3. London branch deposits (£ million) 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
Foreign currencies Total amount
 
Note: 
The figures in the graph are for June of each year. 
Sources: 
1) Total amounts were prepared from ‘Summary balance sheets’, each year, LA,  
F2/CA/Acc.2. 
2) Foreign-currency figures were prepared from ‘London branch U.S. dollar deposits’, Jan. 
1965, LA, F2/D/Rep.8.  
 
Table 1. Bolsa’s share in the British eurocurrency deposit market 
Year Entire British banking Bolsa’s eurocurrency Bolsa’s share 
 sector (US$ million) deposits (US$ million)  
1957 198.8  10.6  5.3% 
1958 358.4  106.2  29.6% 
1959 756.0  190.9  25.3% 
1960 1792.0  281.7  15.7% 
1961 2111.2  351.0  16.6% 
1962 2906.4  444.7  15.3% 
1963 3584.0  420.8  11.7% 
Sources:  
1) For Entire British banking sector, ‘U.K. banks’ external liabilities’, p. 100. 
2) For Bolsa’s eurocurrency deposits, ‘London branch U.S. dollar deposits’, Jan. 1965, LA, 
F2/D/Rep.8. 
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Table 2. Shares of eurocurrency deposits of banks in Britain (%) 
 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 
Clearing banks 22.5  14.3  11.1  6.6  4.5  5.1  
Other British banks 1.0  1.3  1.5  1.1  2.6  2.1  
British overseas banks 33.3  25.0  18.9  20.8  23.0  22.2  
Accepting houses 10.8  10.7  11.8  16.1  18.6  17.1  
U.S. banks 16.6  22.3  39.1  35.9  27.0  32.3  
Japanese banks  0.9  6.0  7.3  10.8  9.8  
Other foreign banks 15.8  25.5  11.3  12.2  13.5  11.5  
Total amount 
(£ million) 116 255 596 707 1027 1147 
Notes: 
a All figures are for Dec. of each year, except those for 1963, which are for April. 
b The figures for 1958 to 1960 are eurodollar deposits only 
Sources:  
1) For 1958 to 1962, Battilossi, ‘Banking with multinational’, p. 106, tab. 5.1. 
2) For 1963, Schenk, ‘The origins of the eurodollar market’, p. 230. 
 
Table 3. Bolsa’s deposits by country (top five) 
1955 £ million Percentage  1960 £ million Percentage 
Spain 17.3 20.9%  U.K. 90.8 45.4% 
U.S. 13.5 16.3%  Argentina 26.9 13.5% 
U.K. 11.7 14.2%  U.S. 14.0 7.0% 
Brazil 10.2 12.3%  Brazil 7.9 4.0% 
Guatemala 5.3 6.4%  Spain 6.8 3.4% 
       
1963 £ million Percentage     
U.K. 242.9 74.5%     
U.S. 25.8 7.9%     
Argentina 23.2 7.1%     
Spain 8.6 2.7%     
Brazil 8.3 2.6%     
Sources: ‘Summary balance sheets’, Dec. 1955, Dec. 1960, and June 1963, LA, F2/CA/Acc.2. 
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Table 4. Bolsa’s profits by country (top five) 
1955 £ thousand Percentage  1960 £ thousand Percentage 
U.S. 215 17.1%  Argentina 698 30.1% 
U.K. 201 16.0%  U.K. 696 30.0% 
Argentina 193 15.3%  U.S. 519 22.4% 
Chile 174 13.8%  Brazil 262 11.3% 
Spain 114 9.0%  Spain 172 7.4% 
       
1963 £ thousand Percentage     
U.K. 1811 55.0%     
Argentina 744 22.6%     
U.S. 436 13.2%     
Brazil 378 11.5%     
Chile 198 6.0%     
Sources: ‘Summary profit & loss ledgers’, Dec. 1955, Dec. 1960, and Dec. 1963, LA, 
F2/CA/Acc.2. 
 
Table 5. Uses of dollar deposits at the London branch (£ million) 
 1960 1961 1962 1963 
Dollar re-deposits 216 199 216 161 
Dollar loans & overdrafts 0 18 34 46 
Pound conversion: Loans 41 59 76 81 
Pound conversion: Pool 17 29 57 95 
Source: ‘London branch utilisation of U.S. dollar deposits’, 11 January 1965, 
LA, F2/D/Rep.8.  
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Table 6. Dollar re-deposits by the London branch: Top ten countries and Bolsa branches 
(£ million) 
1960   1961  
Japan 49.5  Japan 55.5 
U.K. 31.5  Eurobank 19.5 
MNB 24.5  MNB 15.2 
Eurobank 22.5  U.S. 14.5 
U.S. 16.0  Belgium 1.3 
France 16.0  Germany 12.8 
Italy 12.0  U.K. 10.2 
Canada 11.5  Canada 10.0 
Germany 5.4  Hungary 6.0 
Belgium 5.2  Finland 5.2 
BOLSA 
branches 12.4  Bolsa branches 14.7 
     
1962   1963  
Italy 34.4  Italy 43.5 
France 29.9  Japan 32.5 
U.K. 29.2  Eurobank 24.5 
Japan 27.0  U.K. 10.5 
Eurobank 23.5  Finland 6.2 
MNB 11.7  Germany 4.9 
Finland 15.2  France 3.7 
Germany 6.8  MNB 3.5 
Norway 4.2  U.S. 3.0 
Canada 4.0  Hungary 2.0 
Bolsa branches 12.9  Bolsa branches 13.1 
Notes:  
a MNB is the acronym for the Moscow Narodny Bank of Soviet Union. 
b Eurobank represents the Banque Commerciale pour l’Europe of Soviet Union. 
Source: ‘London branch re-deposits of U.S. dollars’, 11 January 1965, LA, F2/D/Rep.8.  
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Table 7. US$ foreign assets & liabilities of UK banks and Bolsa (1964) (%) 
 Liabilities  Assets  
 UK banks Bolsa 
UK 
banks Bolsa 
Austria 6 1 0 1 
Belgium 2 2 4 3 
Denmark 0 1 3 0 
France 2 3 6 9 
West Germany 2 3 4 3 
Italy 2 4 12 16 
Netherlands 3 3 4 1 
Norway 1 1 2 1 
Spain 1 1 1 0 
Sweden 2 1 3 0 
Switzerland 24 15 3 0 
Other Western Europe 1 0 2 2 
Total Western Europe 46 35 44 36 
U.S. 14 33 33 12 
Canada 14 17 2 6 
Latin America 5 3 3 13 
Middle East 10 1 2 0 
Japan 0 1 10 22 
Other 7 1 6 11 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Total amount (£ million) 3430 368 2926 257 
Note:  
The figures presented in the table are as of 30 June 1964 for banks in the U.K. and 13 
November 1964 for Bolsa. 
Source: ‘External liabilities and assets in U.S. dollars of Bolsa, London branch, as compared 
with of all U.K. banks’, Bank of England Archives, C48/156. 
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Table 8. London branch’s US$ deposits at other branches (£ thousand) 
 New York Brazil Paris 
Buenos 
Aires 
June 1960 8000 1300   
Dec. 1960 8000 3800 2600  
March 1961 8000 5500 2000  
July 1961 8000 5000 9820  
Oct. 1961 11000 5300 1800  
Dec. 1961 11000 2800 9000  
Feb. 1961 9000 1000   
May 1961 9000 1650  500 
Aug. 1961 9000 1900  500 
Oct. 1961 9000 2400  1650 
Dec. 1961 9000 2300  1650 
March 1963 9000 6640  650 
June 1963 9000 7380   
Aug. 1963 9000 3640   
Nov. 1963 9000 3300   
Dec. 1963 9100 4050     
Source: ‘London branch re-deposits of U.S. dollars’, 11 January 1965, LA, F2/D/Rep.8.  
 
Table 9. Dollar loans and overdrafts given by the London branch 
(Nov. 1963) (US$ million) 
 Total amount 
Latin America 24.32 
Eastern Europe 7.55 
West Germany 2.62 
Other 15.22 
Total amount 49.71 
Source: ‘London branch re-deposits of U.S. dollars’, 11 Jan. 1965, LA, F2/D/Rep.8. 
 
Table 10. Dollar re-deposits of the London branch (Dec. of each year) (£ thousand) 
  1960 1961 1962 1963 
Argentina 0 0 589 0 
Brazil 1357 1000 821 1446 
U.S. 2143 3928 3214 3247 
France 928 321 0 0 
Source: Tab. 8 
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Table 11. BOLSA’s inter-branch accounts by selected countries (£ thousand) 
 1960 1961 1962 1963 
Argentina 10 140 800 1200 
Brazil -2800 -1100 70 -700 
U.S. -1600 -5100 -7100 -6500 
France -1000 -200 40 20000 
London 18100 8300 35700 89700 
Head office 
(in 
London) -13200 -3200 -28600 -82500 
Source: Appendix 
 
Table 12. Percentage of dollar re-deposits in total balance sheets 
 1960 1961 1962 1963 
Brazil 84.8% 90.9% ― 206.6% 
U.S. 133.9% 77.0% 45.3% 49.9% 
France 92.8% 160.5% ― ― 
Sources: Appendix and table 8 
 
Table 13. Supply of funds by the London branch to other branches (£ thousand) 
 1960 1961 1962 1963 
Dollar re-deposits (a) 4428 5284 4625 4693 
Total supply of funds (b) 4900 5100 7100 7200 
 (a)/(b) 90.4% 103.6% 65.1% 65.2% 
Notes: 
a Dollar re-deposits represent balances as of Dec. of each year. 
b Total supply of funds represents total supply of funds minus supply of funds to the head 
office in London. 
Sources: Appendix and table 8 
 
Table 14. Percentage of trade settlement in dollar for Latin America and Europe 
 
% of 
US$ 
Argentina, Uruguay, 
Paraguay 7% 
Brazil, Chile, Peru, Bolivia 41% 
Other 96% 
Total for Latin America 33% 
Notes: 
a Venezuela is not included. 
b ‘Other’ includes Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and El Salvador. 
Source: Economic Commission for Europe, ‘European trade with Latin America’, p. 21. 
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Table 15. Shares in Brazil’s foreign trade       (%) 
 U.S.  Britain  
 Exports Imports Exports Imports 
1951 50.9 45.4 10.2 9.2 
1952 54.4 45.3 2.8 9.3 
1953 49.9 30.6 4.7 4.1 
1954 37.9 36.1 4.8 1.1 
1955 43.2 26.3 4.3 1.5 
1956 50.6 32.1 3.6 3.8 
1957 48.6 40.3 4.9 3.7 
1958 45.9 39.6 4.6 3.6 
Note: Exports from Brazil and imports to Brazil 
Source: Naciones Unidas, Boletín económico de América Latina, Cuadro 30, pp. 48–53, and 
Cuadro 31, pp. 54–61. 
 
 
 
